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Equity across Generations and Uncertainty 
within a Generation: A Welfare Analysis 
of the National Pension System† 
By KYOOHO KWON* 
This paper utilizes a life-cycle overlapping-generations model to 
quantify the welfare effects of plans to postpone the depletion of the 
National Pension Fund. In order for the model to incorporate the 
rapidly changing demographic structure of Korea fully, we build and 
calibrate a model in transition directly. The model is considered suitable 
for analyzing the effects of demographic changes on the Korean 
economy and the effects of plans to change the National Pension System. 
According to a simulation of the model, to postpone the depletion of the 
National Pension Fund for 30 years, the premium rate must be 
increased to 18.3% from the current rate of 9%. By postponing the 
depletion of the fund reserve, young and future generations gain 
significantly at the expense of the older generations. The simulation 
results should be, however, interpreted as meaning that the current 
system is unjustifiably partial to the older generations. Moreover, given 
the current premium rate, it is desirable to strengthen the income-
redistribution function of the National Pension System.  
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National Pension System, Pension Reform 
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  I. Introduction 
 
he long-term financial outlook of the National Pension System is a grave 
concern. According to the Third Official Fiscal Projections in 2013 by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, the National Pension Fund will begin to run a deficit 
in 2044 and will run out of funds and enter insolvency by 2060 under the
current system. The projected path of the National Pension Fund in proportion to the 
nominal GDP is shown in Figure 1. Also shown in the figure is the author’s extension 
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of the path employing the officially projected macroeconomic variables if the current 
premium rate (9%) is maintained after the depletion of the reserve funds. As the 
deficit will explode, the debt issued by the National Pension will increase rapidly 
after 2060 and reach an unsustainable amount, exceeding 100% of GDP by 2080. 
The long-term fiscal problems of the National Pension System are attributable in 
part to the rapidly changing demographic structure of Korea. According to Statistics 
Korea, as of 2010 the working-age (15~64) population, which largely determines the 
size of the labor force, is forecast to shrink at an accelerated rate due to a persistently 
low fertility rate, dwindling to 21.8 million by 2060, a mere 59% of its peak of 37.0 
million in 2016. It is approximated that the working-age population will decrease by 
0.3 million, or 1~2 percent per annum, over the next 45 years. Korea’s demographic 
structure is also changing at an unprecedentedly rapid pace, even by international 
standards. In terms of the old-age dependency ratio, Korea is projected to become 
one of the most aged countries by 2050 among OECD member countries, as shown 
in Figure 2. Korea's old-age dependency ratio is the 27th lowest among the 32 OECD 
members as of 2014, but it is expected to become the third lowest in 2050. 
In addition to the rapid population aging, the long-term fiscal problem is deepened 
by the structural issues of the National Pension System, which has been referred to 
as the “low burden but high benefits” issue. Despite the two revisions of the National 
Pension Act in 1998 and 2007, current generations are expected to receive generous 
pension benefits compared to their contributions. According to Choi and Shin 
(2015), the cohorts born between 1930 and 1990 are expected to receive benefits 
much more than the twice their contributions if measured by the present value term. 
As a result, workers who will be working in the labor market after 2060 must bear a 
considerable burden to maintain the current system. As stated in the Third Official 
Fiscal Projections, if the National Pension System becomes a pay-as-you-go system 
after it is depleted, it is projected that the premium rate must rise sharply to 21.4~22.9 
percent from the current level of 9 percent in order to balance the budget until 2083. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. THE PROJECTED PATH OF THE NATIONAL PENSION FUND (% OF NOMINAL GDP) 
Note: The dashed line is a projection by the author based on the projected macro-variables by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare. 
Source: Third National Pension Fiscal Projection, The Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2013. 
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FIGURE 2. PROJECTION OF THE AGED DEPENDENCY RATIO FOR OECD COUNTRIES 
Note: The horizontal axis indicates the old-age dependency ratio in 2014. The vertical axis indicates the old-age 
dependency ratio in 2050. 
Source: Kwon (2017). 
 
In Japan, where the pension fund is being depleted, it is reported that the functioning 
of its pension system is being threatened because only 40 percent of the young 
insured are paying their scheduled pension premiums. In order for the National 
Pension System to be sustainable for a longer period of time, it seems inevitable to 
reform the current system in some way. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze plans to postpone the exhaustion of the 
National Pension Fund and study welfare implications from an intergenerational 
perspective. Because a reform of the National Pension System will affect 
macroeconomic variables as it will affect the labor supply, consumption and savings 
behavior of the majority of workers, it is desirable to study this within a general 
equilibrium framework. To do this, we build a life-cycle overlapping-generations 
macroeconomic model populated by heterogeneous agents. In addition to the 
differences across generations arising from the differences in the macroeconomic 
environment over time, such as changes in the GDP growth rate, wage growth rate, 
and the interest rate, the model economy is composed of heterogeneous economic 
agents in terms of income histories and wealth holdings, even within a generation.  
The macroeconomic models in this class have been widely applied to analyses of 
the macroeconomic effects and to the study of welfare implications. Examples 
include population aging, pension reforms, and labor market institutions. For 
example, Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), Nishiyama (2003), Imrohoroglu and Kitao 
(2012) analyze and evaluate plans to improve the Social Security System. Heathcote, 
Storesletten, and Violante (2010) study the welfare implications of the rising wage 
inequality starting in the 1970s. However, this type of model has not been popularly 
applied to the Korean economy thus far. Notable exceptions are Kim and Chang 
(2008) and Hong, Lee, and Kang (2016). Kim and Chang (2008) analyzed the 
macroeconomic effects of the introduction of the EITC policy and Hong, Lee, and 
Kang (2016) analyzed the macroeconomic effects of the extension of the retirement 
age.  
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There are many papers which present research on the macroeconomic effects of 
reforms of the National Pension System employing a structural macroeconomic 
model such as a variant of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). These include Shin and 
Choi (2010), Chun and Yoo (2004), Choi, Shin and Kwon (2015), and Hong (2016) 
to name a few. Most previous studies are, however, silent with regard to how much 
the model economy can explain the growth path of the Korean economy. Moreover, 
by unrealistically assuming the complete capital market, this model ignores the effect 
of labor market uncertainties on individual welfare considerations and may not 
properly gauge the social value of the National Pension System. 
Concerning the building of the structural model in this paper, we attempt to 
incorporate the features listed below in addition to those of the typical overlapping-
generations model. First, workers are heterogeneous in terms of income history and 
asset holdings, and the modelling of the National Pension System is based on the 
actual system. Second, because a reform in the National Pension System involves 
the future growth path of Korean economy, the model economy should have at least 
some explanatory power of Korea's past growth path. , in order to reflect the rapid 
changes in the population structure, not only changes in the population due to 
changes in fertility rates but also changes in life expectancy should be modelled 
explicitly.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to build a 
macroeconomic model encompassing these features. Moreover, given that the 
Korean economy is never considered to have reached a steady state, it is inadequate 
to calibrate a structural macroeconomic model of Korea based on the steady state 
assumption. If the steady state assumption is adopted to calibrate a model, it is 
practically impossible to replicate the rapid demographic transition of Korea, which 
is unacceptable when evaluating the fiscal reforms of the National Pension System. 
To bypass this difficulty, we directly build and calibrate a model economy in 
transition by adopting the calibration strategy suggested by Kwon (2017). 
According to the model simulations of this study, the National Pension System 
should be reformed in the direction of a more equitable system across generations 
and changed to strengthen the income redistribution function within a birth cohort 
even at the current premium rate. We simulate the model economy to evaluate plans 
to fiscally stabilize the National Pension System. Because there is no explicit 
agreement pertaining to the definition of the fiscal stabilization of the National 
Pension system, we calculate the equilibrium premium rate to delay the depletion of 
the reserve funds for 30 years from the date of insolvency in the benchmark model 
economy. According to the model simulation, we find that it is necessary to raise the 
premium rate by 9.3 percentage points from the current premium rate of 9 percent. 
In order to push back 50 years instead of 30 years, a rate increase of 11.0 percentage 
point is required. Although these plans are not strong enough to prevent the National 
Pension Fund from becoming depleted, they will enhance equity across generations 
significantly. Aside from the goal of postponing the depletion of the reserve funds, 
we also evaluate a plan to strengthen the income redistribution function of the 
system. By redistributing more income within a cohort, the welfare of the young and 
future generations can be expected to increase, as this effort reduces the uncertainty 
of the consumption path within a generation.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 specifies the model economy; 
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Section 3 calibrates the model based on various macro- and micro-datasets; Section 
4 reports the benchmark model simulation results; Section 5 conducts a welfare 
analysis based on the model economy; Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. A Macroeconomic Model of the National Pension System 
  
A. Demographic Structure 
 
Time t  is discrete and the model period is one year. The model economy is 
populated by DJ  overlapping generations. Individual workers may live up to DJ  
periods and face mortality risks in each period. Let ( , )T j tψ  denote the conditional 
probability that an individual of age j  in period t  survives to the next period 
1t + . Let ( )Tn t  denote the growth rate of the population of age 1 in period t . Let 
, (1 )j t DN j J≤ ≤   denote the population of age j   in period t  . The total 
population in period t  is calculated as 
1
,
DJ
j
t j tN N
=
= . 
Then, the population of each age evolves over time, as follows: 
 
1, 1 1,[1 ( 1)]t T tN n t N+ = + +  
1, 1 ,( , ) , 1 1j t T j t DN j t N j Jψ+ + = ≤ ≤ −  
1, 1 0J tN + + =  
 
We refer to the population of age j  in period t  as the thk  cohort. Note that 
age, time, and cohort indices are not independent given the one-to-one function that 
1k t j= − +  . In order to simplify the notations and present the model clearly, 
individual workers’ utility maximization problems are laid out with cohort and time 
indices, whereas macro-variables are done so with age and time indices.  
 
B. Individual Worker’s Problem 
 
An individual worker is a unit that makes independent economic decisions 
concerning consumption-savings and the labor supply. Each worker starts to 
participate in the labor market at the age of WJ  and retires at the exogenous age of 
RJ  . Enrollment in the National Pension is determined at the age of WJ  if the 
worker starts working after the introduction of the system. Otherwise, the enrollment 
is determined at the time of the introduction. We assume that the enrollment decision 
is not a choice but an exogenous assignment. 
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Utility Maximization Problem of a Retired Worker 
At the exogenous age of RJ  , workers retire from the labor market and make 
consumption and savings decisions. Retired workers who are eligible for National 
Pension benefits q  are characterized by the individual state vector ( , ; , )a q j k , 
where a  is the amount of asset holding, q  is the amount of National Pension 
benefit, j  denotes the person’s age, and k  is the cohort index. Let tr  denote the 
market interest rate, and borrowing is not allowed. The tax rate for asset income is 
denoted as atτ . 
A retired worker’s decision problem is formulated recursively. Let RKV  denote 
the value function of the retired agent in the state of ( , ; , )a q j k  . The decision 
problem can be represented as  
 
,
( , ; , ) max{ ( , ) ( ; ) ( , ; 1, )}R RK K Kc aV a q j k u c h j k V a q j kβψ′= + ′ ′ +  
 
s.t. 
 
[1 (1 ) ] ,at t tc a r a b qτ+ ′ ≤ + − + +  
0, 0, ,h a q q= ′ ≥ = ′  
 
where ,c a′  and tb  denote the consumption, savings, and transfer income other 
than the pension benefit, respectively. The parameter β  denotes the preference 
discount rate, and ( ; )K j kψ  denotes the conditional probability that an individual 
in the thk  cohort of age j  survives to the next period.1 The amount of q′  is 
equal to q , which is determined at the time of each worker’s retirement. ( )u ⋅  is 
the instantaneous utility function, which is separable with regard to consumption and 
hours of work. It is determined as follows:2 
 
1 1 1( , ) log( ) / (1 )u c h c Bh γ
γ
+
= − +  
 
This type of utility function is chosen to support a balanced growth path. The 
parameter γ  denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity of work hours. The 
decision rules that solve this problem are expressed as  
 
( , ; , )RKc c a q j k=  and ( , ; , )RKa a a q j k′ = . 
 
1 ( ; ) ( ; 1)j k j k jK Tψ ψ≡ + − . 
2Note that 0h =  for a retired worker. 
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Let NRKV  denote the value function of a retired worker who is not eligible for 
pension benefit. The decision problem of this type can be recursively written as  
 
,
( ; , ) max{ ( , ) ( ; ) ( ; 1, )}NR NRK K Kc aV a j k u c h j k V a j kβψ′= + ′ +  
 
s.t. 
 
[1 (1 ) ]at t tc a r a bτ+ ′ ≤ + − +  
0, 0.h a= ′ ≥  
 
The decision rules that solve this problem are ( ; , ), ( ; , )NR NRK Kc c a j k a c a j k= ′ = . 
 
Utility Maximization Problem of a Worker 
Individual workers begin participating in the labor market at the age of WJ  and 
retire from the market at the age of RJ . Workers are heterogeneous in terms of labor 
market productivity. Labor market productivity measured in efficiency units is 
assumed to be composed of three parts. First, a type-dependent fixed effect z  is 
determined at the age of WJ   drawn from the probability distribution, ( )z zπ  . 
Second, an age-dependent component jε   is assumed to be deterministic, a 
persistent idiosyncratic shock x   evolves following the conditional probability 
distribution, ( , )X x xπ ′ . We assume that there is no difference in the labor market 
productivity structure across generations.3 
When an individual worker aged j  supplies h  hours to the labor market, he 
supplies j zxhε  units of efficiency labor and earns t jw zxhε , where tw  denotes 
the market wage rate for an efficiency unit of labor in period t . If he is enrolled in 
the National Pension, his pension contribution is calculated as { }min ,t t j tw zxh yτ ε , 
which is not part of his taxable income under current Korea tax law. Here, tτ  denotes 
the pension premium rate. The amount of income over the predetermined level ty  
is exempt from pension contributions. Hereafter, following the National Pension Act, 
we refer to ty  as the maximum Standard Yearly Income and { }min ,t j tw zxh yε  
as the Standard Yearly Income. We assume that individual workers begin their 
economic lives with no financial assets, and borrowing against the future labor income 
is not allowed. 
A worker enrolled in the National Pension is characterized by the state vector 
 
3Therefore, the difference in the labor market productivity rates among cohorts reflects the differences in the 
level of the total factor productivity and the degree of capital deepening. 
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( , , , ; , )a p x z j k . The variable p  denotes his average Standard Yearly Income up 
to the age of 1j − , which summarizes his individual labor income history. Let WKV  
denote the value function of a worker in the state of ( , , , ; , )a p x z j k . The decision 
problem of the agent can be recursively represented as  
 
, ,
( , , , ; , ) max{ ( , ) ( ; ) ( 1, )}WK Kc a hV a p x z j k u c h j k NVF j kβψ′= + +  
 
s.t. 
 
( ; 1, ) , 1
( 1, ) ( , ) ( , , , ; 1, ) , 1
R
K R
W
X K R
x
V a q j k if j J
NVF j k x x V a p x z j k if j Jπ
′
 ′, ′ + = −
+ = 
′ ′ ′ ′ + < −
 
 
[1 (1 ) ] (1 )( ),a lt t t t t jc a r a b w zxhτ τ ε θ+ ′ ≤ + − + + − −  
 
{ }min , ,t t j tw zxh yθ τ ε=  
 
( )1 [ ( )]( ) 1 ( )
K
K
K T
A kp p j J k
j J k A t
θ ′ = − + 
− +  
 
 
( ; ), 1,K Rq Q p k if j J′ = ′ = −  
 
0 1, 0,h a≤ ≤ ′ ≥  
 
where ( )KJ k   denotes the age at which thk   cohort workers are enrolled in the 
National Pension, ( )TA t  denotes the Average Yearly Income, which is the average 
Standard Yearly Income of all insured workers in period t  . ( )KA k  denotes the 
three-year average value of the Standard Yearly Income of all thk  cohort workers 
immediately before their retirement. It is determined using the equation below. 
 
3
1
1( ) [ ([ 1] )]3K T RA k A k Jτ
τ
=
= + − −  
 
The decision rules that solve this problem are expressed as 
 
( , , , ; , ), ( , , , ; , ), ( , , , ; , ).W W WK K Kc c a p x z j k h h a p x z j k and a a a p x z j k= = ′ =  
The pension contribution reflecting the optimal working hours is denoted as 
( , , , ; , ).WK a p x z j kθ  
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As noted above, the amount of the National Pension benefit is determined at the 
beginning of retirement. Here, we specify how it is determined. The amount of the 
pension benefits depends on (i) how long a worker contributes to the service, i.e., the 
insured period, and (ii) how much a worker contributes over the insured period as 
summarized by his average Standard Yearly Income p . Roughly, the variable p  
recodes and summarizes the history of labor earnings. Let ( ; )KQ p k  denote the 
amount of pension benefits paid to a thk  cohort individual worker with p . Under 
the modified formula suitable for the model, it is determined as 
 
(1)  ( ; ) ( )[ ( ) (1 ) ][1 0.05( ( ) 20],K K A K A KQ p k D k A k p n kα α= + − + −  
where ( )Kn k  denotes the insured period of a thk  cohort worker. The variable 
( )KD k  determines the income replacement ratio, and it depends on k  due to the 
reforms of the National Pension System in 1998 and 2007. 
We now clarify how the average Standard Yearly Income p  is determined in the 
model. The process of calculating the value of p  is most easily explained by a 
simplified example. Suppose there is an insured worker who contributed for T  
periods before he retires, as shown in Table 1. In period 1, let 1B  be his Standard 
Yearly Income when the average Standard Yearly Income amounts to 1A . Let 1B′  
denote the reevaluated value of 1B  in the period T  , which is determined as 
1 1 1( / ).tB B A A′ = ×  Note that TA  is the Average Standard Yearly Income in 
period T  .4 The multiplying factor 1/tA A  can be, therefore, interpreted as the 
cumulative average income growth rate for T  periods. If the amount of 1B  is to 
be put into a saving account for T  periods, the bank would roll over 1B  with the 
market interest rate. What the National Pension does is similar to what the bank does, 
but it promises to return the savings compounded not with the interest rate but with 
the labor income growth rate. The future values of 2 3, , , TB B B  are determined 
similarly, which are 2 3, , , TB B B′ ′ ′ , respectively. Finally, the reevaluated average 
 
TABLE 1—AN EXAMPLE: REEVALUATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE STANDARD YEARLY INCOME 
Insured 
Period (t) 
Average Standard Yearly Income  
(of all insured workers) 
Standard Yearly Income 
(of an worker) 
Reevaluated Standard 
Yearly Income 
1 𝐴ଵ 𝐵ଵ 𝐵ଵᇱ =  𝐵ଵ × (𝐴் 𝐴ଵ⁄ ) 
2 𝐴ଶ 𝐵ଶ 𝐵ଶᇱ =  𝐵ଶ × (𝐴் 𝐴ଶ⁄ ) 
⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 
T 𝐴் 𝐵் 𝐵ᇱ் =  𝐵் × (𝐴் 𝐴்⁄ ) 
  
 
4 The current national pension system is being revalued based on average earnings for the three years 
immediately preceding the pension receipt. For the sake of clarity, an example was given to reevaluate the average 
earnings of the year before the pension receipt. 
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Standard Yearly Income for the periods during which it is insured is calculated as 
1
,(1/ ) ( / )
T
T
t
t tp T B A A
=
= ×  and the period-by-period update formula is shown in 
the decision problem. 
Here, we investigate equation (1) further. The parameter Aα  determines the 
degree of income redistribution within a cohort. If the value of Aα  increases, the 
benefit amount will be closer to the average income among insured people so that 
the benefit difference among the insured decreases. Conversely, if the value of Aα  
decreases, the benefit will depend more on the individual earnings history such that 
the National Pension plays a role similar to that of a bank. The variable ( )KD k  in 
equation (1), known as the income replacement ratio, determines the annual pension 
payment given the pension contribution history. The value of ( )KD k  in equation 
(1) can be calculated with the officially announced proportional constant td . Given 
the time series of td , the value of ( )KD k  is calculated as 
 
(2)   
1
1
1( ) ( 1) ( 1)
R
W
k J
K t
t k jR W
D k d
k J k J
+ −
= + −
=
+ − − + −
  
A worker who is not enrolled in the National Pension is characterized by the 
individual state vector ( , , ; , ).a x z j k 5 Let NWKV  denote the value function of this 
type of worker. The decision problem can be recursively represented as 
 
, ,
( , , ; , ) max{ ( , ) ( ; ) ( 1, )}NWK Kc a hV a x z j k u c h j k NVF j kβψ′= + +  
 
s.t. 
 
( ; 1, ) , 1
( 1, ) ( , ) ( , , ; 1, ) , 1
NR
K R
NW
X K R
x
V a j k if j J
NVF j k x x V a x z j k if j Jπ
′
 ′ + = −
+ = 
′ ′ ′ + < −
 
 
[1 (1 ) ] (1 )a lt t t t t jc a r a b w zxhτ τ ε+ ′ ≤ + − + + −  
 
0 1, 0h a≤ ≤ ′ ≥  
 
The decision rules that solve this problem are denoted as 
 
 
5As noted above, enrollment in National Pension Service is not a choice but a random assignment among the 
same cohort workers, which implies that labor market productivity does not depend on enrollment in the National 
Pension Service. 
VOL. 41 NO. 2     Equity across Generations and Uncertainty within a Generation 11 
( , , ; , ), ( , , ; , ), ( , , ; , ).NW NW NWK K Kc c a x z j k h h a x z j k a a a x z j k= = ′ =  
 
It is convenient to reorder the value functions and the decision rules in the order 
of time t  to construct the macroeconomic variables, as follows: 
 
( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , ), ( , ; , ) ( , ; , ),W W R RT K T Kv a p x z j t v a p x z j k a q j t a q j kφ φ= =  
 
where { , , , }, { , }, 1.v c h a c a and k t jθ φ∈ ∈ = − +  
 
( , , ; , ) ( , , ; , ), ( ; , ) ( ; , ),W NW NR NRT K T Kv a x z j t v a x z j k a j t a j kφ φ= =  
 
where { , , }, { , }, 1.v c h a c a and k t jφ∈ ∈ = − +  
 
Finally, let ( , , , ; , )WTN a p x z j t   and ( , ; , )RTN a q j t   denote the insured 
population aged j   in period t   in the states of ( , , , )a p x z   and ( , )a q  , 
respectively. In the same manner, ( , , ; , )NWTN a x z j t  and ( ; , )NRTN a j t  denote the 
population who are not enrolled in the National Pension. 
 
C. The Representative Firm’s Problem 
 
In the model economy, there exists a representative firm which produces output 
tY  by combining capital tK  and labor tL  using a constant return-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas production function for each time period t , 
 
1
t t t tY A K L
α α−
= , 
 
where tA  denotes the total factor productivity in period t  and α  is the output 
elasticity of capital. The aggregate labor tL  is measured in units of efficiency. Capital 
stocks are depreciated at the rate of tδ  in period t  after production occurs. We 
assume that both the factor markets and the goods market are competitive. 
The firm’s profit maximizing problem can be stated as follows, 
 
1
,( , ) argmax ( ) ,t td dt t K L t t t t t t t tK L A K L w L r Kα α δ−= − − +  
 
where dtL  and dtK  denote the demand for labor and the demand for capital during 
period t  , respectively. Then, dtL   and dtK   satisfy the following first-order 
conditions: 
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1 1( ) ( )d dt t t t tA K L rα αα δ− − = +  
 
(1 ) ( ) ( )d dt t t tA K L wα αα −− =  
 
D. Construction of Macroeconomic Variables and 
Procedure of Market Clearing 
 
The aggregate supply of capital in period 11, stt K ++   is determined by the 
individuals’ decisions on savings and the evolution of the National Pension Fund. 
On the one hand, in order to calculate the aggregate savings by individuals, we need 
to specify how unintended bequests are distributed to living individuals. The amount 
of assets that the individual aged j  in period t  in the state of ( , , , )a p x z  saves is 
( , , , ; , ).WTa a p x z j t   There are ( , , , ; , ).WTN a p x z j t   people in this state. The 
individual survives in period 1t +   with a probability of (1 ( , )).T j tψ−   If a 
mortality shock arrives, we assume that the assets, ( , , , ; , ),WTa a p x z j t   are 
distributed evenly to the living population. The same process holds for the retired 
population. Under these assumptions, the aggregate savings by individuals during 
period 1t +  are calculated as follows: 
 
1
1
, , ,
,
( , ) ( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
( , ) ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )
R
W
R
J
s W W
t T T T
j J a p x z
J
R R
T T T
j J a q
S j t a a p x z j t N a p x z j t
j t a a q j t N a q j t
ψ
ψ
−
+
=
=
=
+
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the total amount of unintended bequests in period 1t +   to living 
households is calculated as follows:  
 
1
1
, , ,
,
1
, ,
[1 ( , )] ( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
[1 ( , )] ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )
[1 ( , )] ( , , ; , ) ( , , ; , )
[1 ( , )] ( ; , ) ( ;
R
W
R
R
W
J
s W W
t T T T
j J a p x z
J
R R
T T T
j J a q
J
NW NW
T T T
j J a x z
NR NR
T T T
B j t a a p x z j t N a p x z j t
j t a a q j t N a q j t
j t a a x z j t N a x z j t
j t a a j t N a j
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
−
+
=
=
−
=
= −
+ −
+ −
+ −
 

 
, )
R
J
j J a
t
=

 
 
On the other hand, the National Pension Fund (SF) evolves as follows: 
VOL. 41 NO. 2     Equity across Generations and Uncertainty within a Generation 13 
(3)      
1
,
1
, , ,
(1 ) ( , ; , )
( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
R
R
W
J
R
t t t T
j J a q
J
W W
K K
j J a p x z
SF r SF qN a q j t
a p x z j t N a p x z j tθ
+
=
−
=
= + −
+

 
 
If the National Pension Fund is to be depleted in some period 1t + , we assume 
that the National Pension System switches to a pay-as-you-go system. In this case, 
the pension premium rate tτ  is endogenously set to ensure the period-by-period 
budget balance of the National Pension. 
We assume that the model economy is closed such that the rate of return on capital 
is determined in the domestic capital market. Regarding assumption, we rely on the 
empirical findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who show that the correlation 
between the investment rate and the savings rate is close to one in the long run. 
Despite the fact that the open economy assumption is much more realistic for Korea, 
we would have to project the world interest rate until 2300 to solve the model if such 
an assumption were to be adopted.6 
With the assumption of a closed economy, the aggregate supply of capital in period 
11, stt K ++  , is the sum of the aggregate savings by individuals and the National 
Pension Fund. 
 
1 1 1
s s
t t tK S SF+ + += +  
 
The aggregate supply of labor in period , ,stt L  is the sum of efficiency unit of 
labor supplied by individuals: 
 
1
, , ,
1
, , ,
( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
( , , ; , ) ( , , ; , )
R
W
R
W
J
s W W
t j T T
j J a p x z
J
NW NW
j T T
j J a p x z
L zxh a p x z j t N a p x z j t
zxh a x z j t N a x z j t
ε
ε
−
=
−
=
=
+
 
 
 
 
The Average Yearly Income in period , ( ),Tt A t  is calculated as follows: 
 
 
6Considering that other economies also have aging populations, the trend in the future capital flows will be 
determined by the relative speed of Korea's demographic transition. It may be beneficial to model a multi-country 
large-scale overlapping-generations model to account for the effects of the world-wide demographic transition on 
the global rates of return on capital, as was done in Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2007) and Krueger and Ludwig 
(2007). The effects of Korea’s demographic transition on the Korean economy can then be analyzed in a single 
framework under the open economy assumption. 
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1
, , ,
1
, , ,
( ) min{ ( , , , ; , ), } ( , , , ; , )
/ ( , , , ; , )
R
W
R
W
J
W W
T t j T t T
j J a p x z
J
W
T
j J a p x z
A t w zxh a p x z j t y N a p x z j t
N a p x z j t
ε
−
=
−
=
  
=     
 
 
 
Finally, we need to specify the evolution of the population distribution over the 
state space. The distribution of the retired population aged 1j +  in period 1t +  is 
determined as follows: For any asset holdings a′  in period 1t + , 
 
,
( , ; 1, 1) ( , ) 1[ ( , ; , ) ] ( , ; , ),
( ; 1, 1) ( , ) 1[ ( ; , ) ] ( ; , ).
a q
R R R
T T T T
NR NR NR
T T T T
a
N a q j t j t a a q j t a N a q j t
N a j t j t a a j t a N a j t
ψ
ψ
′ + + = = ′
′ + + = = ′

  
 
The distribution of the retired population aged RJ  in period 1t +  is determined 
as follows: For any asset holdings a′  and the pension benefits q′  in period 1t + , 
 
, , ,
.
( , ; 1, 1)
1[ ( , , , ; , ) ]( , ) ( , , , ; , )1[ ( ( , , , ; , ), 1) ]
R
T
W
T W
T TWa p x z K T
N a q j t
a a p x z j t a
j t N a p x z j t
Q p a p x z j t t j q
ψ
′ ′ + +
 = ′ ×
=   
− + = ′ 
  
 
Note that the amount of the pension benefit is being determined for the eligible 
population aged RJ  in period 1t + . 
The distribution of workers aged RJ  in period 1t +  who are not eligible for the 
pension benefit evolves as follows: For any asset holdings a′  in period 1t + , 
 
(4)    ( )
, ,
.
( ; 1, 1)
( , ) 1[ ( , , ; , ) ] ( , , ; , )
NR
T
W NW
T T T
a x z
N a j t
j t a a x z j t a N a x z j tψ
′ + +
= = ′  
The distribution of the workers aged 1W RJ j J≤ < −  in period t  evolves as 
follows: For all combinations of ( , , ), ( , )a p x a x′ ′ ′ ′ ′  in period 1t + , 
 
(5)   
, , ,
( , , ; 1, 1)
( , )1[ ( , , , ; , ) ]( , ) 1[ ( , , , ; , ) ] 1[ ] ( , , , ; , )
W
T
W
X T
T W Wa p x z T T
N a p x z j t
x x a a p x z j t a
j t
p a p x z j t p z z N a p x z j t
πψ
′ ′, ′ ′ + +
′ = ′ ×
=
= ′ × = ′
  
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(6)   
, ,
( , , ; 1, 1)
( , ) ( , )1[ ( , , ; , ) ] ( , , ; , )
NW
T
NW NW
T X T T
a x z
N a x z j t
j t x x a a x z j t a N a x z j tψ π
′ ′ ′ + +
= ′ = ′  
The distribution of the population aged Wj J=  in period 1t +  is determined 
as follows: For any z , 
 
(7)  ,
,
(0,0, , ; , 1) ( ) ( 1)[1 ( 1)] ,
(0, , ; , 1) ( )[1 ( 1)][1 ( 1)] ,
W
W
W
T W Z T T J t
NW
T W Z T T J t
N x z J t z t n t N and
N x z J t z t n t N
π χ
π χ
+ = + + +
+ = − + + +
 
where ( 1)T tχ +  denotes the insured rate by the National Pension Service for the 
birth cohort who will become aged WJ  in period 1t +  . Here, x  denotes the 
average value of the persistent part of the individual productivity, .x  
 
E. Definition of the Competitive Equilibrium 
 
Let ( ) { ( ), ( , ), , , , , , , , , , , }lT T T t t t t t t t t t t tS t n t j k A d y B K L SFαψ δ τ τ τ=   be the 
aggregate state of the model economy in period .t  We assume that economic agents 
perfectly foresee the entire path of the state of the aggregate economy, 
0
{ ( )} .T t TS t ∞=  
Given the path of the aggregate state of the economy, the equilibrium of the 
economy consists of the value functions { , , , };W R NW NRT T T TV V V V   the associated 
decision rules { , , , },W R NW NRT T T Tc c c c   { , , , },W R NW NRT T T Ta a a a   and { , };W NWT Th h   the 
sequence of the production plans for firms { , };t tK L  the factor prices { }tw , { }tr , 
the National Pension System { , , };t t ty SFτ   transfer income { };tB   and the 
population measures { , , , }W R NW NRT T T TN N N N  such that 
 
1. Given the path of the aggregate state of the economy and the factor prices, the 
value functions and the decision rules solve the workers’ dynamic problems. 
 
2. Given the path of the factor prices, { , }t tK L   denotes the solution to the 
representative firm’s profit maximization problems.  
 
3. Given the path of the factor prices, the factor markets clear and satisfy 
 
, .s d s dt t t t t tK K K L L L= = = =  
 
4. The goods market clears as follows: for all t , ,t t t tY C I G= + +  where tC  
denotes private consumption, tI  denotes investment, and tG  denotes government 
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expenditures. tC  and tI  are calculated as follows: 
 
1
, , ,
,
1
, ,
,
( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
( , ; , ) ( , ; , )
( , , ; , ) ( , , ; , )
( ; , ) ( ; , )
R
W
R
R
W
R
J
W W
t T T
j J a p x z
J
W W
R R
j J a q
J
NW NW
T T
j J a x z
J
NW NW
R R
j J a q
C C a p x z j t N a p x z j t
C a q j t N a q j t
C a x z j t N a x z j t
C a j t N a j t
−
=
=
−
=
=
=
+
+
+
 

 

 
 
1 (1 )t t t tI K Kδ+= − −  
 
5. The National Pension Funds evolves following the equation (3) and switches to 
a pay-as-you-go system if it is depleted. 
 
6. The government’s budget maintains a period-by-period balance for all t : 
 
1
, , ,
1
, ,
( )
( , , , ; , ) ( , , , ; , )
( , , ; , ) ( , , ; , )
R
W
R
W
s
t t t t t
J
l W W
t T T
j J a p x z
J
l NW NW
t T T
j J a x z
G r K
a p x z j t N a p x z j t
a x z j t N a x z j t
ατ δ
τ ψ
τ ψ
−
=
−
=
= −
+
+
 
 
 
 
7. The amount of accidental bequests is equal to the amount of transfers to the 
living population: 
 
1
, , , ,
1
, , ,
( , , , ; , ) ( , ; , )
( , , ; , ) ( ; , )
R
W R
R
W R
J J
s d W W
t t t T t T
j J a p x z j J a q
J J
NW NR
t T t T
j J a x z j J a q
B B b N a p x z j t b N a q j t
b N a x z j t b N a j t
−
= =
−
= =
= = +
+ +
  
  
 
 
8. The distribution of the population over the state space evolves following the 
equations (4), (5), (6), and (7).  
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In order to quantify the model economy, we must specify the characteristics of the 
balanced growth path to which the model economy eventually converges.  
First, we assume, in the end, that the net fertility rate and the conditional survival 
probabilities converge and become constant such that the following conditions are 
satisfied. 
 
* * *( ) , ( , ) ( ) 1 .T T Rn t n j t j for j J and all t Tψ ψ= = ≤ ≤ ≥  
 
After passing DJ  periods upon satisfaction of these conditions, we have 
 
* * *
1 (1 ) ,t tN n N+ = +  
* * * *
, 1 1 ,/ /j t t j t tN N N N+ + =  
 
In other words, the growth rate of the total population is equal to the net fertility 
rate, and the age distribution of the population becomes stationary. 
Second, we assume that the growth rate of the total factor productivity converges 
in the end, i.e., 
 
* *
1 / .t t AA A for all t Tγ+ = ≥  
 
Suppose that a stationary population distribution is achieved and that the growth 
rate of total factor productivity is constant over time. In such a case, the stationary 
recursive competitive equilibrium is recursive competitive equilibrium in which the 
following characteristics are satisfied. For all ,t  the consumption and savings of 
the representative household increase in proportion and the supply of labor remains 
constant: 
 
*( , , , ; 1, 1) ( , , ; , 1, ),W WT c tC a p x z j t C a p x z j tγ+ + = +  
 
*( , ; 1, 1) ( , ; , 1, ),R RT c tC a q j t C a q z j tγ+ + = +  
 
*( , , , ; 1, 1) ( , , ; , 1, ),W WT a ta a p x z j t a a p x z j tγ+ + = +  
 
*( , ; 1, 1) ( , ; , 1, ),R RT a ta a q j t a a q z j tγ+ + = +  
 
( , , , ; 1, 1) ( , , ; , 1, ),W WT th a p x z j t h a p x z j t+ + = +  
 
*( , , ; 1, 1) ( , ; , 1, ),NW NWT c tC a x z j t C a x z j tγ+ + = +  
 
*( ; 1, 1) ( ; , 1, ),NR NRT c tC a j t C a z j tγ+ + = +  
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*( , , ; 1, 1) ( , ; , 1, ),NW NWT a ta a x z j t a a x z j tγ+ + = +  
 
*( ; 1, 1) ( ; , 1, ),NR NRT a ta a j t a a z j tγ+ + = +  
 
( , , ; 1, 1) ( , , ; , 1, ),NW NWT th a x z j t h a p x z j t+ + = +  
 
where 
1
* * * 1( ) ,c a A αγ γ γ −= =  for all i  and *.t T≥  
 
Fourth, the National Pension Service operates as a pay-as-you-go system on the 
balanced growth path. 
Finally, with the conditions above being satisfied, the aggregate supply of savings 
also increases at a fixed rate and the factor prices are determined as follows: 
 
* *
1, ,t t w tr r w wγ+= =  where 
1
* * 1( )W Ar αγ −=  
 
F. A Welfare Measure 
 
In order to analyze the welfare implications of changes to the National Pension 
Service, a welfare criterion must be defined beforehand. The welfare function in this 
study is the total utility obtainable during a lifetime of an individual, which is 
expected at the time the individual initially become economically active. In order to 
specify the welfare function, some notations must be introduced. 
An allocation of individual consumption and labor supply during a lifetime can be 
expressed as ( , ) { , } .D
W
J
j j j Jc h c h =≡ 7 The lifetime utility ( )W  obtainable with this 
allocation is, then, calculated as [( , )] ( , ).D
J
Wj J
Wj J
j jW c h u c hβ
=
−
≡   As there is some 
uncertainty about individual labor productivity, there is also uncertainty in the above 
allocation. The expected lifetime utility reflecting this uncertainty is expressed as 
follows and used here as a welfare measure of a given cohort. 
 
[( , )] { [( , )]} ( , )D W
W
J
j J
j j
j J
EW c h E W c h E u c hβ −
=
 
≡ =     
 
This measure has the following characteristics. First, because the consumption of 
goods and the consumption of leisure are assumed to be normal, the expected 
lifetime utility increases as the consumption increases or the working hours 
decreases. Second, the uncertainty of the allocation ( , )c h  reduces the expected 
lifetime utility because we assume a risk-averse utility function.  
 
7In this subsection, subscripts for cohorts are omitted for convenience. 
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In order to quantify the change in welfare according to a reform of the system, this 
study applied the certainty equivalent variation, CEV , which can be regarded as 
the answer to the next question: “In order to avoid a change of the expected lifetime 
utility after a reform of the system, how much consumption should be increased or 
decreased from the optimal allocation before the reform?” Specifically, we denote 
the optimal allocation during a lifetime in the benchmark economy as 0 0( , )c h  and 
the optimal allocation in the new equilibrium after a reform as * *( , )c h  . At this 
point, the changes in welfare due to institutional changes can be measured as  
 
( )
( )
* * * *
0 0
0 0
[( , )] ( , )
(1 ) ,
(1 ) , .
D
W
W
D
W
W
J
j J
j J
J
j J
j j
j J
EW c h E u c h
E u CEV c h
EW CEV c h
β
β
−
=
−
=
 
=   
 
= +  
 = + 

  
 
We can decompose CEV   into the component ( )CCEV   resulting from the 
change in consumption from 0c  to *c  and the component ( )HCEV  resulting from 
the change in labor supply from 0h  to *h  . These components are calculated as 
follows:8 
 
* 0 0 0
* * * 0
[( , )] [((1 ) , )]
[( , )] [((1 ) , )]
C
H
EW c h EW CEV c h
EW c h EW CEV c h
= +
= +
 
 
The part of the welfare change due to the change in consumption schedule, 
CCEV , can be further decomposed into a component reflecting the change in the 
consumption level ( )CLCEV   and a component reflecting the change in 
consumption schedule uncertainty ( )CDCEV  as follows: 
 
0 0 0 0
* 0 * 0
ˆ[( , )] [((1 ) , )]
ˆ[( , )] [((1 ) , )]
CL
CD
EW c h EW CEV c h
EW c h EW CEV c h
= +
= +
 
 
{ } *0 0 00ˆ ˆ ,
D
D
W
W
J
J j
j jj J
j j J
c
c c c
c=
=
   
= ≡       
 
where 0jc  and *jc  are the average consumption values of the populations whose 
 
8 ,CEV CEVc , and HCEV  are related such that (1 )(1 )c HCEV CEV+ +  or .c HCEV CEV CEV≈ +  
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ages are j  before and after the system change, respectively. Similarly, the welfare 
change due to the change in labor supply, HCEV , can be divided into HLCEV  and 
.HDCEV  
 
III. Calibration 
  
A. Demographic Transition 
 
The demographic transition of the model economy is calibrated to match the 
history and the projection by Statistics Korea as of 2010. To solve the model, 
projections of fertility and survival probabilities are required to produce the age 
distribution of the population at each period. The net fertility rates ( )Tn t   are 
calculated to match the growth rate of the one-year-old population until 2060. 
However, to completely solve the model economy quantitatively, we need 
information beyond 2060. Between 2060 and 2100, the net fertility rate projections 
are obtained from the Statistical Research Institute. After 2100, they are assumed to 
be fixed at zero. The conditional survival probabilities, ( , ),T j tψ  are drawn from 
the life tables projected by Statistics Korea. Because the projected life tables are in 
five-year periods, the probabilities for the interim periods are approximated by linear 
interpolation. After 2060, the survival probabilities are assumed to remain fixed at 
the 2060 levels. Under the assumptions specified above, the population distribution 
reaches a steady state in 2200, wherein the population growth rate is zero percent 
and the age distribution of the population does not change over time. 
 
B. Utility and Labor Market Productivities 
 
The parameter γ  denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity of work hours. 
Micro-estimates of γ  range from 0.1 to 0.7. We choose a value of 0.4, which is a 
widely accepted value for the class of the model economy considered in this paper. 
We choose the weight parameter for disutility from working, B  , such that the 
average number of hours of work is 1/3 between 1989 and 2014 in the model 
simulation. The preference discount factor β  is set such that the average K/Y ratio 
of the model economy during 1989~2014 matches the average value of the K/Y ratio 
data for the same period, which is 2.9. Note that the average K/Y ratio of the model 
economy between 1989 and 2014 is pinned down, but the dynamics is determined 
endogenously in the model. The definition of the capital stock for calculating the 
K/Y ratio is the private production capital stock from the National Balance Sheet. 
As specified in the previous section, individual workers are heterogeneous along 
three dimensions that affect their labor productivity: a deterministic age-dependent 
component 65 24{ } ,j jε =   a type-dependent fixed effect z  , and a persistent 
idiosyncratic shock, x . These specifications and the calibration strategy are adopted 
from Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). For the type-dependent fixed effect, we 
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consider two ability types 1 exp( )zz σ= −   and 2 exp( )zz σ=   with an equal 
population mass of 0.5. We assume that [ln( )] 0E z =  and 2[ln( )] .zVar z σ=  
For the persistent idiosyncratic shock, we specify the stochastic process such that 
ln( )x  follows the AR(1) process, as follows: 
 
2ln( ) ln( ) , ~ (0, ).x x xx x N ερ ε ε σ′ = +  
 
We discretize the AR(1) process with seven nodes using the method suggested by 
Rouwenhorst (1995). We further assume that x   is equal to the unconditional 
average ( )x≡  when workers enter the economy. 
The variance of logged productivity is, then, determined along the age dimension 
as follows: 
 
(8)  
1
2 2 2
0
[ln( ) ln( ) ln( )] 0
j
h
j j z x
h
Var z x εε σ σ ρ
−
=
+ + = + +   
In order to quantify the specified labor productivity, we need the parameter values 
for 65 24{ }j jε =  are determined in such way that the model-generated age profile of 
log earnings in 2014 matches the data. In Figure 3, the age earnings profile from the 
model simulation is represented by the thick straight line and the calibrated values 
of 65 24{ }j jε =  put into the model are represented by the thick dashed line. Moreover, 
the values of 2 , ,z xσ ρ  and 2εσ  are calibrated jointly to match the cross-sectional 
variance of individual labor earnings. As shown in the panel on the right in Figure 
3, the cross-sectional variance of logged individual labor earnings increases almost 
linearly along the age dimension. To mimic this pattern, we must have 1,xρ ≈  as 
implied by equation (8). We, however, limit the value to 0.99 for the parameter  
  
 
FIGURE 3. NORMALIZED LIFE-CYCLE PROFILE AND VARIANCE OF LABOR EARNINGS 
Source: Korean Labor & Income Panel Study, 2012 and 2015. 
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xρ  for technical reasons. The parameter 2zσ  is determined to match the variance 
for the age of 24, which is 0.1, and the calibrated value is 2 0.1.zσ =  Finally, the 
parameter 2εσ  is calibrated for the model-generated variance for the age of 60 to 
match the data, making this value 0.6. The calibrated value for the parameter 2εσ  is 
0.016. 
 
C. National Pension System 
 
The National Pension System was introduced in 1988 and has since been revised 
twice through reforms, in 1997 and in 2007. The model parameters determining the 
contributions and benefits are calibrated to mimic the current system, which includes 
the changes put into place by the two reforms. The premium rates are set to 3%, 6% 
and 9% for the periods of 1988~92, 1993~97, and 1998 onwards, respectively. Note 
that the system is switching to a pay-as-you-go system if the National Pension Fund 
becomes insolvent. In such a case, the premium rate is set endogenously to ensure 
the period-by-period budget constraint. Between 1988 and 1998, the value of Aα  
was 0.43, but the value has been set to 0.5 since then. The pension reform in 1997, 
therefore, strengthened slightly the income-redistribution role of the National 
Pension System.  
When the National Pension was introduced, the value of the proportional constant 
td  was set to 0.35, which implied an income replacement ratio of 35% for the 20-
years-of-enrollment period. As part of the first reform in 1997, the value was lowered 
to 0.30. With the second reform in 2007, the value of td  was set to decrease 
annually by 0.005 until reaching the level of 0.2 in 2028. After 2028, it is assumed 
to remain fixed at the value of 0.2. Given the time-series of td  , the values of 
( )KD k  are calculated using equation (2). Figure 4 reports the calculated income 
replacement ratios ( )KD k  across birth cohorts. When the system was introduced 
in 1988, an income replacement ratio of 35% after the 20-years-of-enrollment period 
was targeted, but it is slated to be reduced to the level of 20% eventually. Because 
the system must honor the previous contributions at the time of the reform, only the 
future proportional constants had to be decreased to cut the pension benefits, which 
implied a loss in benefits for the young and for future generations. 
In the model economy, the proportion of the insured in each cohort is determined 
exogenously. For each birth cohort, it is calculated by dividing the number of insured 
by the number of the population when the cohort reaches the age range of 55~59, as 
shown in Figure 5. For the 1962~1970 cohort for whom the values are not yet 
realized, this proportion is assumed to increase to 70%. For those born after 1970, it 
is assumed to stay at 70%, which is in line with official projections. 
The maximum Standard Yearly Income ty  is approximately the twice of the 
Average Yearly Income ( )TA t  in 2014. We assume that this ratio is maintained for 
all simulation periods. 
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FIGURE 4. THE PROJECTED INCOME REPLACEMENT RATIO BY BIRTH COHORT ( ( )KD k ) 
Note: Based on the author’s calculation. An insured period of 20 years before retirement is assumed. 
Source: The National Pension Act, 1988, 1997, and 2007. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. THE ENROLLMENT RATE IN THE NATIONAL PENSION BY BIRTH COHORT 
Note: The enrollment rates for the age group of 55~59 are reported in the figure. 
Source: 1995~2015 National Pension Statistics Facts Book, National Pension Service. 
  
 
D. Production function and other parameters 
 
With the Cobb-Douglas production function assumption, if the goods and factor 
markets are competitive, the output elasticity of capital α  turns out to be equal to 
the capital income share. We choose a value of 0.35, which is the average capital 
income share between 2000 and 2014. The definition of the capital income share we 
employ is 1 (labor income + self-employed income) / .GDP−  
The total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated with the standard growth 
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accounting method. In this paper, the TFP is assumed to be identified as the Solow 
residual. Thus, different measures of labor and capital input yield different values of 
the TFP. To maintain consistency with the model economy, we define the labor input 
as the total number of employees weighted by the age-productivity profiles. For the 
future values of total factor productivity, we adopted the TFP growth rate from Cho 
(2014) until 2035 and assume that there is continued growth thereafter at a constant 
rate of 1.3 percent per annum. The depreciation rate of capital stock is calculated to 
match the average private gross real fixed investment of national accounts during the 
period of 1989 and 2014, which is 29%. The calculated depreciation rate is 8%. We 
used a value of 5.5% before 2000 to reflect the rising pattern of the depreciation rate 
in the data. Given the value of the output elasticity of capital of 0.35 and the mean 
value of the capital-output ratio of 3 after 2000, the implied marginal productivity of 
capital is about 4% between 2000 and 2015. The labor income tax rate and capital 
income tax rate are set to 15%.  
Model simulations require the initial asset holdings by age in the year 1989. We 
use Statistics Korea's Household Asset Survey of 2006 to determine the age-asset 
distribution in 1990; although this survey was conducted for the year 2006, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the earliest data available. The aggregate wealth of the 
model economy in 1989 is then then rescaled to match the K/Y ratio in 1990, which 
is 2. Within each cohort in the year 1989, the assets are evenly distributed. 
 
IV. Benchmark Model Simulation 
 
A. In-sample Performance of the Model 
 
We compare the simulated aggregate variables with the relevant historical data, in 
this case the employment growth rate and the real GDP growth rate. Panel A in Figure 
6 shows the time series of the GDP growth rate. The model captures the downward 
trend in the GDP growth well, as the endogenous variables of the model react in a 
consistent manner with the actual data when the demographic structure and the TFP 
are fed into the model.  
Panel C of Figure 6 depicts the aggregate labor growth rate of the model economy 
and the employment growth rate from the Economically Active Population Survey.9 
Also shown in the figure is the growth rate of the population aged 24~64 in the 
model economy. The employment growth rate exhibits a slow downward trend and 
short-run fluctuations. The trend in the employment growth rate is well captured by 
the growth rate of the population aged 21~64 of the model economy. As reported in 
Table 2, the contribution of labor to GDP growth was 1.0% per annum in the 1990s 
and 0.8% per annum in the 2000s. In the model economy, the corresponding numbers 
are 1.3% and 0.9%, respectively. However, not well replicated by the model 
economy are the relatively high employment growth rates in the first half of the 
2010s. During this period, we observe a slowdown in GDP growth and a relatively 
 
9 A closer empirical counterpart for our aggregate labor here can be constructed using total working hours 
weighted by the age-productivity profile. However, the time series of average working hours can be obtained for the 
years after 2004, which is much shorter than the in-sample time horizon. 
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(A) GDP growth rate             (B) Capital-to-output ratio 
 
(C) Labor input growth rate          (D) Growth rate of capital 
FIGURE 6. MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES OF THE BENCHMARK MODEL ECONOMY 
Note: 1) The working-age is between 24 and 64. 2) The definition of capital stock is private production capital stock 
as reported in the National Balance Sheet. 
Source: Economically Active Population Survey, Statistics Korea; National Account, National Balance Sheet, Bank of 
Korea. 
  
high growth rate of employment, resulting in low values of the TFP. In turn, when 
we feed the realized TFP into the model, it is difficult to generate the high 
employment growth observed in the data. Part of the problem stems from the fact 
that we assume that TFP growth accelerates in the second half of the 2010s. Given 
that agents perfectly foresee the entire path of TFP growth, the working hours chosen 
by the agents are opposite to what we observe in the data. 
Panel D in Figure 6 shows the growth rate of capital stock. Capital stock refers to 
the share of capital stock held by the private sector from the National Balance Sheet. 
The long-term downward trend in capital accumulation is also well captured in the 
model simulation. The secular decline reflects the fact that the slowdown in TFP 
growth and the decline in the growth rate of the working-age population have 
lowered the demand for investment. However, the investment boom in the 1990s is 
not well explained by the model. We view this shortcoming as also stemming partly 
from the perfect-foresight information assumption. That is, the investment boom 
during this period may have been based on optimistic expectations for the Korean
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TABLE 2—GROWTH ACCOUNTING FOR THE BASELINE MODEL 
(Unit: %, %p) 
Period Output Growth Rate (1+2+3) 
Contribution of Labor 
(1) 
Contribution of Capital 
(2) 
Contribution of TFP 
(3) Wage Growth Real Interest Rate 
1991~2000 6.8 (6.7)  1.3 (1.0) 3.1 (3.3) 2.4 (2.4) 4.8 [3.8] 8.0 [8.2] 
2001~2010 4.6 (4.3)  0.9 (0.8) 1.8 (1.6) 1.9 (1.9) 3.3 [3.8] 4.2 [2.5] 
2011~2020 2.3 (2.9*) 3.8 0.1 (1.1*) 1.2 (1.2*) 0.9 (0.6*) 2.1 [1.8*] 3.0 [1.4*] 
2021~2030 1.5 ( ) 2.9 -0.5  0.7  1.3  2.2  2.3  
2031~2040 0.8 ( ) 1.9 -0.9  0.3  1.3  2.1  2.0  
2041~2050 0.3 ( ) 1.4 -1.1  0.1  1.3  2.0  2.0  
2051~2060 0.6 ( ) 1.1 -0.8  0.1  1.3  1.8  2.2  
2061~2070 0.7 ( ) 0.7 -0.8  0.1  1.3  1.8  2.4  
2071~2080 0.9 ( ) 0.9 -0.7  0.3  1.3  1.9  2.7  
2081~2090 0.8 ( )  -0.8  0.3  1.3  2.0  2.6  
2091~2100 0.7 ( )  -0.8  0.3  1.3  2.0  2.6  
⋯ ⋯   ⋯  ⋯  ⋯  ⋯  ⋯  
2200~2210 2.0   0.0  0.7  1.3  2.0  3.0  
Note: 1) Growth accounting outcomes based on data are reported in the parentheses. The results from the benchmark model economy are reported on the left side of the parentheses. 
The numbers on the right side of the parentheses are the GDP growth rates from the Third National Pension Fiscal Projection. 2) The numbers in the angled parentheses represent 
the average of hourly real wages and the corporate bond yields (three-year, AA-). The results from the benchmark model economy are reported on the left side of the angled 
parentheses. 3) The numbers with the superscript, *, are average values for 2011~2015. 
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economy. However, economic agents in the model who perfectly forecast the 
slowdown in the economy afterwards do not invest as much, as indicated by the data 
for that period. 
Panel B in Figure 6 shows the time series of the capital-output ratio. Because the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the degree to which the capital to 
output ratio changes is closely related to the changes in the price variables. Shown 
in Figure 7 are the wage growth rate and the real interest rate. Despite the fact that 
short-term fluctuations are not well replicated, the trends of these variables are well 
captured by the model economy, which is crucial for the purpose of this paper. The 
trend of the model interest rates is similar to that of real corporate bond yields, but 
these rates have been approximately 1%p higher since the 2000s. The interest rate of 
the model reflects the marginal productivity of capital, which is not a concept directly 
comparable to corporate bond yields. However, corporate bond yields are known to 
be an important variable for forecasting the future fiscal condition of the National 
Pension, and these are reported here for interested readers.  
The growth path of the benchmark model economy, including future projections, 
is reported in Table 2. To analyze the factors contributing to the secular decline in 
GDP growth, we also report the results in the growth accounting form. The numbers 
in parentheses are the growth accounting results based on the data to extract the time 
series of the TFP. In addition, on the right of the parentheses are the GDP growth 
projection rates quoted from the Third Long-Term Fiscal Projections in 2013 for 
comparison. 
The ten-year average GDP growth rate of the model economy declines from 6.8% 
in the 1990s to 4.6% in the 2000s, and to 2.3% in the 2010s, and is projected to 
stabilize at around 0.7~0.9% after 2050s. The declines in the GDP growth rate are 
mainly attributable to the decreased contribution of labor input. In the model 
economy after 2030, the contribution of labor is close to -1%p per annum, which 
reflects the dramatic decrease in the population aged 21~64. The decline in the 
working-age population will slow the GDP growth rate further through less 
  
 
FIGURE 7. WAGE GROWTH RATES AND REAL INTEREST RATES 
Note: The hourly wage rate is calculated as the ratio of the total wage bill to the total working hours. 
Source: Business Labor Force Survey, 1993~2015, Ministry of Employment and Labor; ECOS, Bank of Korea. 
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FIGURE 8. LORENZ CURVE FOR LABOR INCOME (LEFT) AND NET WORTH (RIGHT) 
Source: Household Finance and Welfare Survey, 2014. 
 
accumulation of physical capital. The contribution of physical capital to GDP growth 
is also steadily declining, reaching only 0.1% per annum in the 2050s. As shown 
later, the National Pension Fund in the model begins to decline from its peak in 2030 
and becomes depleted in 2050. The accumulation of capital is in part negatively 
affected by the decumulation of the fund from 2030 to 2050.  
In the long run, the model economy reaches a balanced growth path, where the 
population structure and the TFP growth stabilize. As presented in Table 2, total 
factor productivity increases by 1.3% per annum and physical capital increases by 
0.7% per annum. In addition, GDP grows at a rate of 2.0% per annum. 
We examine the cross-sectional inequality of income and wealth among economic 
agents in the model. The panel on the left in Figure 8 shows the Lorenz curve for 
labor earnings in 2014 from the model. Also shown is the Lorentz curve from actual 
data (Data) using the Household Finance and Welfare Survey for 2014. The 
inequality of earned income is slightly lower in the model economy, but the 
difference is not meaningfully significant. The Gini coefficients of the earned income 
are 0.35 in the model and 0.38 in the data. The Lorentz curve for wealth is shown in 
the panel on the right in Figure 8. The degree of wealth inequality is determined 
endogenously by workers’ optimal choices. It can be seen that the degree of wealth 
inequality is somewhat greater in the model. In 2014, the Gini coefficient of net asset 
holdings was 0.58 in the Household Finance and Welfare Survey, but it is 0.64 in the 
model. The Lorentz curve for wealth indicates that the model generates too many 
workers with relatively low wealth, which is commonly observed in the class of 
model applied in this study according to Hugget (1996). 
 
B. Benchmark Model Simulation Results for the National Pension System 
 
In the benchmark model economy, the National Pension Fund reaches its peak in 
2030 relative to GDP and runs out of funds in 2049, as reported in Figure 9. After 
that date, the National Pension System shifts from a partially funded system to a 
pay-as-you-go system and the equilibrium premium rate soars to a level of 29.3% from 
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FIGURE 9. PATH OF THE NATIONAL PENSION FUND RELATIVE TO GDP 
AND THE EQUILIBRIUM PREMIUM RATES: BENCHMARK MODEL 
  
the level of 9% in 2050. The premium rate stays at about 30% until 2070 and then 
falls slightly to 26~27% for a considerable period after 2070. On the balanced growth 
path, the equilibrium premium rate turns out to be 18.3%, which is still very high 
compared to the then-current value of 9%. Thus, even without population aging, the 
9% premium rate is insufficient to maintain the financial stability of the National 
Pension System in the benchmark model economy. 
In order to examine the generational burden and benefits associated with the 
current National Pension System in the model, Table 3 reports the average premium 
rate and the income replacement ratio for selected cohorts. The income replacement 
ratios are calculated based on 20 years of enrollment. The average premium rate 
refers to the overall average premium rate during the insured period for each cohort 
in the model. The drop in the income replacement ratio reflects the two national 
pension reforms in 1998 and 2007. The average premium rate increases very rapidly 
for young and future generations because the system switches to a pay-as-you-go 
system in 2050. The premium rate must skyrocket in order to balance the pension 
budget in the benchmark model economy. 
 
TABLE 3—BENEFITS AND COST OF THE NATIONAL PENSION BY COHORT: BENCHMARK MODEL 
(Unit: %) 
Birth Cohort 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 ⋯ 2200 
Income 
Replacement 
Raito 
30.3 28.1 25.4 22.4 20.7 20.1 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 ⋯ 20.0 
Average 
Premium 
Rate 
8.0 8.3 8.6 9.0 11.5 16.6 21.5 25.8 28.4 27.7 27.0 ⋯ 18.3 
Benefits-Cost Ratio 
Benchmark 
Model 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 ⋯ 0.8 
Choi and 
Shin (2015) 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 · · · · · · ⋯ · 
Note: Table 3 from Choi and Shin (2015). 
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FIGURE 10. BENEFIT-COST RATIO BY BIRTH COHORT: BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
Also reported in Table 3 is the benefits-cost ratio for the selected cohorts. The 
benefits-cost ratio is defined as the ratio of the present value of the total amount of 
pension benefits to the present value of the total contributions by a cohort. The 
present value is calculated with the equilibrium interest rate of the model and is 
evaluated on the start of economic activity for each cohort. The ratio decreases with 
the birth cohorts because the income replacement ratio decreases though the 
premium rate increases. Note that in the long run, the ratio converges not to the level 
of 1.0 but to the level of 0.8 in the benchmark model simulation.10 Thus, having a 
profit ratio lower than 0.8, the 2010~2050 cohorts in Table 3 are sacrificing 
themselves to support the National Pension System in the benchmark model 
simulation. On the other hand, the earlier birth cohorts benefit from the system. 
Choi and Shin (2015) estimated the benefits-cost ratio by cohort based on 
historical data and the Third Long-Term Fiscal Projections. Their results are shown 
at the bottom of Table 3 and in Figure 10. In general, our simulation results are 
consistent with theirs, but the benefits-cost ratio for the 1990 birth cohort is much 
lower in the benchmark model. This occurs because the premium rate soars when 
the fund reserve becomes insolvent, whereas Choi and Shin (2015) assume the then-
current 9% premium rate to continue indefinitely. In comparison with Choi and Shin 
(2015), we contend that our model can be considered reasonably successful in 
replicating the core features of the National Pension System. 
 
V. An Analysis of Welfare Changes in the National Pension System 
Improvement Plans 
  
A. Increase in the Premium Rate 
 
This subsection reports simulation results to achieve the fiscal stabilization of the 
 
10As discussed earlier, pension benefits are affected by the Standard Yearly Income revaluated using the average 
labor income growth rate. The benefits-cost ratio in the long run will, therefore, be affected by the gap between the 
wage growth rate and the market interest rate. 
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National Pension System by raising the premium rate. Because there is no explicit 
agreement on the definition of fiscal stabilization as it pertains to the National 
Pension System, we adopt the definition suggested by the Third National Pension 
Improvement Committee in 2013. It suggested as a goal to maintain a reserve fund 
at more than twice the projected annual expenditure until 2083. In this subsection, 
we calculate the equilibrium premium rate necessary to remain solvent for another 
30 and 50 years from the date of the depletion in the benchmark model economy. 
More specifically, we find the minimum premium rates that allow the National 
Pension Fund to avoid depletion until 2080 (Plan 1) and 2100 (Plan 2). We then 
analyze the welfare consequences based on the welfare criterion presented in Section 
3. To simplify the problem, we assume that the government will announce a one-time 
unexpected premium rate increase in 2021 and implement the plan immediately. 
Reported in the left panel of Figure 11 is the equilibrium premium rate after the 
reforms. It was found that is necessary to raise the premium rate by 9.3%p for Plan 
1 and 11.0% p for the Plan 2 from the current premium rate of 9%.  
The macroeconomic effects of the Plan 1 are reported in Table 4. The numbers 
reported in Table 4 are the percentage deviation in levels from the benchmark model 
for the selected years. The numbers in the parentheses are the simulation results, in 
which the wage growth rate and the interest rate are fixed at the level of the 
benchmark model. 
If the price variables are not allowed to vary, the capital stock increases by 19.2% 
in 2060 compared to the benchmark model mainly due to the large increase in the 
National Pension Fund. In the long run, the capital stock, however, converges to the 
level of the benchmark model given that Plan 1 is only a temporary measure. 
The labor supply is low relative to the benchmark model until 2049, when the 
fund depletes in the benchmark model. However, the labor supply increases 
significantly between 2050 and 2080 in response to the drop in the premium rate 
compared to the benchmark model. Like the capital stock, the labor supply returned 
to the same level as the benchmark economy in the long run. With regard to GDP, 
the effect of the increase in the capital stock outweighs that of the decrease in the 
aggregate labor input. Therefore, output also increases except for a few periods 
 
 
FIGURE 11. PATH OF THE EQUILIBRIUM PREMIUM RATE (LEFT) AND THE BENEFITS-COST RATIO (RIGHT)
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TABLE 4—CHANGES IN MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: PLAN 1 
(Unit: %, %p) 
Period GDP Labor Capital Wage Premium Rate(τ) Real Interest Rate 
2021 -0.4 (-0.1) -0.72 (-0.30) 0.00 (-0.05) 0.23 (0.00) 0.09 (0.09) -0.04 (0.00) 
2030 0.8 (2.1) -0.58 (-0.33) 3.46 (6.44) 1.42 (0.00) 0.09 (0.09) -0.26 (0.00) 
2040 1.6 (3.9) -0.88 (-0.97) 6.67 (13.23) 2.64 (0.00) 0.09 (0.09) -0.47 (0.00) 
2050 4.3 (7.3) 3.11 (2.91) 8.93 (18.08) 2.35 (0.00) -0.11 (-0.11) -0.42 (0.00) 
2060 3.8 (7.0) 2.01 (1.59) 9.03 (19.23) 2.67 (0.00) -0.12 (-0.12) -0.49 (0.00) 
2070 2.8 (5.8) 1.33 (0.93) 6.71 (16.23) 2.01 (0.00) -0.11 (-0.12) -0.38 (0.00) 
2080 1.6 (3.9) 0.61 (0.31) 3.69 (10.97) 1.11 (0.00) -0.07 (-0.07) -0.22 (0.00) 
2090 0.4 (1.7) -0.41 (-0.76) 1.53 (6.02) 0.63 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) -0.12 (0.00) 
2100 0.2 (0.9) -0.08 (-0.15) 0.48 (2.79) 0.18 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.00) 
2150 0.0 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.12) -0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
2200 0.0 (0.0) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Note: The results for Plan 1 are reported on the right side of the parentheses. Reported in the parentheses are the partial equilibrium results for Plan 1. The percentage deviation levels 
from the benchmark model are reported. 
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immediately after the implementation of Plan 1.  
In the general equilibrium case, the adjustments in prices to clear markets 
significantly dampen the response of the macroeconomic variables. As the National 
Pension Fund expands, the equilibrium interest rate falls sharply as capital stock 
relative to labor input increases rapidly. The equilibrium interest rate falls by 0.5%p 
in 2060, when its difference reaches the maximum. On the other hand, the increased 
wages induce workers to supply more labor to the market. The expansionary output 
effect reaches its maximum relative to the benchmark simulation in 2050, and the 
GDP increases by 4.3%. To increase the GDP by 4.3% in 30 years, it must grow more 
rapidly by approximately 0.15% per annum from 2021 to 2050, which is a significant 
growth effect given the low growth rate projection in the benchmark model economy. 
The macroeconomic effects of the implementation of Plan 2 are reported in the 
appendix. In order to facilitate comparison with Plan 1, the results for Plan 1 are 
reported again in the parentheses. 
Table 5 shows the changes in the average premium rate and the benefits-cost ratio 
according to Plan 1 and Plan 2. Recall that the equilibrium premium rate to 
implement Plan 1 is 18.2%. Because the transition to the pay-as-you-go system is 
delayed for 30 years, the equilibrium premium rates between 2050 and 2080 drop 
significantly. As a result, the average premium rates during a lifetime for the 
generations working for that period are significantly lower. For example, the average 
premium rate for the 2030 cohort fell by 7.1%. However, the effect on the average 
premium rate for the 2050 cohort was insignificant, as they start working in the mid-
2070s. As shown in Figure 11, Plan 1 is not a long-term solution to the fiscal 
problems of the system, though it postpones the depletion of the fund. On the other 
hand, the average premium rate for the generations born before 2000 increases due 
to the reform. For example, in case of the 1980 cohort, the average premium rate 
rises by 5.3%p by Plan 1, which is still lower than the long-run steady state premium 
rate of 18.3%. 
With the implementation of Plan 2, the fund’s insolvency is postponed until 2100 
  
TABLE 5—BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE NATIONAL PENSION BY COHORT: REFORMS 
(Unit: %) 
Birth Cohort 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 ⋯ 2200 
Income 
Replacement 
Ratio 
30.3 28.1 25.4 22.4 20.7 20.1 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 ⋯ 20.0 
Average Premium Rate 
Benchmark 
Model 8.0 8.3 8.6 9.0 11.5 16.6 21.5 25.8 28.4 27.7 27.0 ⋯ 18.3 
Plan 1 8.0 9.3 11.7 14.3 16.5 18.2 18.2 19.2 21.3 23.5 25.6 ⋯ 18.3 
Plan 2 8.0 9.5 12.3 15.3 17.9 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.8 22.6 ⋯ 18.3 
Benefits-Cost Ratio 
Benchmark 
Model 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 ⋯ 0.8 
Plan 1 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 ⋯ 0.8 
Plan 2 2.9 2.3 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 ⋯ 0.8 
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and the premium rate rises to 20%. As shown in the panel on the right in Figure 11, 
the premium rate and the benefits-cost ratio are greatly equalized across generations, 
despite the fact that Plan 2 does not avoid the depletion of the reserve fund. Note 
also that the benefits-cost ratios for the young and future generations become similar 
to the long-run steady-state value under Plan 2. 
We now turn to look at the welfare implications of the reforms. The change in 
welfare in terms of CEV  for the selected birth cohorts are reported in Table 6 and 
Table 7. The patterns of welfare changes among the generations are similar to the 
changes in the average premium rate reported in Table 5. The welfare of the 
2020~2050 cohorts, who supply labor actively between 2050 and 2080, increases 
significantly due to the reform as the burden of paying a premium falls sharply. For 
example, the welfare gain of the 2030 cohort is found to be 9.3% in terms of CEV , 
which means that the gain amounts to an increase in consumption of 9.3% for every 
possible contingency during the lifetime of this cohort. Note that most of the welfare 
change is explained by the increase in consumption, CCEV . Further decomposition 
of CCEV  shows that the gain from the reduction in uncertainty, CDCEV  is 
negligible relative to CLCEV  . However, note that CDCEV  is positive for the 
 
TABLE 6—CHANGES IN WELFARE FOR THE SELECTED COHORTS: PLAN 1 
(Unit: %) 
Birth 
Cohort 
𝐶𝐸𝑉 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼    𝐶𝐸𝑉ு   
𝐶𝐸𝑉஼௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼஽ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு஽ 
1998 -2.2  -2.3  -2.0  -0.3  0.1  -0.1  0.2  
2000 -1.4  -1.4  -1.2  -0.2  0.1  -0.1  0.2  
2010 3.1  3.2  3.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  
2020 6.7  7.0  7.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4  0.1  
2030 9.3  9.3  8.4  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2040 6.2  6.0  5.4  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.0  
2050 2.6  2.4  2.1  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.0  
2060 -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2100 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2150 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
 
TABLE 7—CHANGES IN WELFARE FOR THE SELECTED COHORTS: PLAN 2 
(Unit: %) 
Birth 
Cohort 
𝐶𝐸𝑉 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼    𝐶𝐸𝑉ு   
𝐶𝐸𝑉஼௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼஽ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு஽ 
1998 -3.4  -3.5  -3.4  -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  
2000 -2.6  -2.7  -2.5  -0.2  0.1  -0.1  0.2  
2010 1.8  1.9  2.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  
2020 6.7  6.9  6.8  0.1  -0.2  -0.3  0.1  
2030 10.7  10.7  9.8  0.8  0.0  -0.1  0.1  
2040 8.7  8.7  8.1  0.5  0.0  -0.1  0.1  
2050 6.0  6.0  5.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2060 3.6  3.6  3.4  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2100 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2150 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
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2030~2050 cohorts; moreover, the magnitude is not too small so as to be ignored. As 
the average premium rates for these cohorts drop sharply, their ability to accumulate 
savings to buffer the effects of productivity shocks on consumption is improved 
significantly. 
The decomposition of welfare change shows that for the young and future 
generations, the reduction in the burden to support the National Pension System 
greatly improves their welfare. Of course, they benefit from the reform at the expense 
of the older generations. However, the welfare analysis in Table 6 together with the 
changes in the benefits-cost ratios reported in Figure 11 clearly indicate that the 
current system is unjustifiably partial to those in the older generations.  
Shown in Table 7 are the welfare changes caused by the implementation of Plan 
2. As expected, the results are qualitatively similar to those of Plan 1 and are 
quantitatively larger than those of Plan 1. However, the results in Table 5 are 
interpreted as meaning that Plan 2 distributes more evenly the burden of supporting 
the National Pension System than Plan 1 across generations, as the benefits-cost 
ratios become closer to the steady-state value for many more generations. However, 
in the model economy, older cohorts that start working before 2021 lose due to the 
reforms. If the implementations of Plans 1 and 2 are determined by voting in 2021, 
it turns out that even Plan 1 is not implementable, as the future generations are not 
eligible to vote.  
We also attempted to find ways to achieve the goal of Plan 1 by reducing the 
benefits of the National Pension, i.e., by adjusting the proportional constant td  . 
However, if the system is to be modified akin to how the second National Pension 
reform was in 2007, this goal cannot be achieved. The reform in 2017 guaranteed 
proportional constants before the reform and announced a lowering of the 
proportional constants for the years to come. By honoring this vested right, we could 
not achieve the goal of postponing the depletion of the reserve fund for 30 years. 
 
B. Strengthening Income Redistribution 
 
As noted in the previous section, the degree of income redistribution is determined 
by the weight parameter Aα   in equation (1). If the weight parameter were 1, 
regardless of individual earnings histories, the amounts of pension benefits would be 
identical for all beneficiaries within a birth cohort. At the other extreme, if the weight 
parameter were 0, the amount of pension benefits only depends on the individual 
earnings history, and there would not be any income redistribution by the National 
Pension System. In this subsection, the change in welfare is measured when the 
weight parameter changes to the value of 0.99 from the current value of 0.5. As the 
value of Aα  increases, it turns out that the welfare evaluated by CEV  for future 
generations increases. Therefore, we only report the simulation results of Aα  being 
equal to the value of 0.99. We assume that the government will announce 
unexpectedly the change in the weight parameter in 2021 and implement it 
immediately in that year. We further assume that only the beneficiaries who retire 
after the announcement are affected by the reform. We refer this reform as Plan 3 
hereafter.  
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The macroeconomic effects of Plan 3 are summarized in Table 8. As in Table 4, 
the percentage deviations in levels from the benchmark simulation are reported. 
Unlike the fiscal stabilization plans in the previous subsection, the reform in this 
subsection changes the system permanently and the macroeconomic variables are 
affected even in the long run. The aggregate labor supply and savings increase, 
resulting in an increase in the total output compared to the benchmark model. The 
wage rate is higher and the interest rate is lower than in the benchmark simulation as 
the aggregate labor supply relative to capital stock increases. 
Researchers who are familiar with the class of model in this paper may see the 
results shown in Table 8 as counterintuitive. Because the uncertainty about allocation 
is expected to decrease due to the reform, the workers directly affected by the reform 
would supply less and save less as the precautionary motive decreases. However, the 
results in Table 8 are considered to be a somewhat special case because there is an 
upper limit on the Standard Yearly income ( )ty . We checked the case in which there 
is no maximum Standard Yearly Income in equation (1). In that model economy, the 
reform caused decreases in the labor supply, savings and output. 
Reported in Table 9 are the changes in welfare in terms of CEV  for the selected  
  
TABLE 8— CHANGES IN THE MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: PLAN 3 
(Unit: %, %p) 
Period Output Labor Input Capital Stock Real Wage Real Interest Rate 
2021 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
2030 0.20 0.02 0.34 0.08 -0.01 
2040 0.34 0.00 0.71 0.19 -0.04 
2050 0.50 0.05 1.06 0.29 -0.05 
2060 0.66 0.15 1.42 0.39 -0.07 
2070 0.76 0.17 1.65 0.46 -0.09 
2080 0.80 0.16 1.76 0.50 -0.10 
2090 0.78 0.12 1.77 0.51 -0.10 
2100 0.78 0.13 1.74 0.50 -0.10 
2150 0.70 0.11 1.58 0.45 -0.09 
2200 0.57 0.07 1.22 0.35 -0.07 
 
TABLE 9—CHANGES IN WELFARE FOR THE SELECTED COHORTS: PLAN 3 
(Unit: %) 
Birth 
Cohort 
𝐶𝐸𝑉 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼    𝐶𝐸𝑉ு   
𝐶𝐸𝑉஼௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉஼஽ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு௅ 𝐶𝐸𝑉ு஽ 
1998 1.5  1.6  0.2  1.4  -0.1  0.0  0.0  
2000 1.6  1.7  0.2  1.4  -0.1  0.0  0.0  
2010 1.7  1.8  0.4  1.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2020 1.8  1.9  0.5  1.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2030 1.9  2.0  0.5  1.5  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2040 2.0  2.1  0.6  1.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2050 2.2  2.3  0.6  1.6  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2060 1.9  2.1  0.7  1.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
2100 1.9  2.0  0.6  1.3  0.0  -0.1  0.0  
2150 1.9  1.9  0.4  1.5  0.0  0.0  -0.1  
2200 1.5  1.5  0.5  1.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  
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cohorts who start working after 2021. The welfare increases for all cohorts in Table 
9 and the improvement show consumption increases of approximately 1.5% to 2.2% 
for every possible contingency compared to the benchmark economy. This increase 
in expected lifetime utility is attributable to the increase in consumption ( CCEV ) 
rather than to a change in working hours. However, unlike the effects of fiscal 
stabilization reforms, the improvement in welfare arises from a reduction in the 
uncertainty of consumption path ( CDCEV ) as opposed to being an effect of the level 
of consumption ( CLCEV ).This result implies that in addition to the self-insurance 
mechanism through adjustments to the labor supply and savings, the National 
Pension System plays a role in providing additional insurance from labor market 
productivity shocks. Given the calibrated labor income process, workers in the 
benchmark economy desire more insurance to be provided by the National Pension 
System, which is reflected in the increase in the expected lifetime utility by the 
reform. The majority (64.3%) of the current population in 2021 are found to be in 
favor of the reform in the benchmark model simulation. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
  
The long-term financial outlook of the National Pension System is a grave 
concern. According to the Third Official Fiscal Projection in 2013 by the Ministry 
of Health and Welfare, the National Pension Fund will begin to run a deficit in 2044 
and will run out of funds in 2060 under the current system. The long-term financial 
problems associated with the National Pension are attributable in part to the rapid 
change in the demographic structure of Korea. In addition to the rapid population 
aging, the long-term financial problems are deepened by certain structural issues of 
the National Pension System, referred to the “low burden but high benefit” issue 
here.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze plans to postpone the depletion of the 
National Pension Fund and to study welfare implications across generations. To do 
this, we build a life-cycle overlapping-generations macroeconomic model populated 
by heterogeneous agents. The model economy is composed of heterogeneous 
economic agents in terms of income histories and wealth holdings even within a 
generation.  
According to simulation results, as in many other studies, it is desirable for the 
National Pension System to be improved in order to increase the equity across 
generations, and it should be promoted to strengthen the income redistribution 
function within a birth cohort, even at the current premium rate. We calculate the 
equilibrium premium rate to delay the depletion of the fund reserve for 30 years from 
the year of depletion in the benchmark model economy. We find that it is necessary 
to raise the premium rate by 9.2%p from the current premium rate of 9%. Although 
the plan is not strong enough to prevent the National Pension Fund from depletion, 
it enhances the equity across generations significantly. Aside from the goal of 
postponing the depletion of the fund, we also evaluate a plan to strengthen the 
income redistribution function of the system. A shortcoming of the welfare measure 
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in the paper is that it does not reflect the overall welfare of the current and future 
population. To overcome this difficulty, Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) introduce 
what they term the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) to analyze the 
social welfare of the older and future generations in a single framework. We leave a 
welfare analysis of this type for future research. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1—CHANGES IN MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: PLAN 2 
(Unit: %, %p) 
Period GDP 
(%) 
Labor 
(%) 
Capital 
(%) 
Wage Real Interest 
Rate (%p) 
2021 (-0.4) -0.5 (-0.7) -0.9 (0.0) 0.0 (0.2) 0.3 (-0.0) -0.1 
2030 (0.8) 1.0 (-0.7) -0.6 (3.5) 4.2 (1.4) 1.7 (-0.3) -0.3 
2040 (1.6) 2.1 (-0.9) -1.0 (6.7) 8.2 (2.6) 3.2 (-0.5) -0.6 
2050 (4.3) 5.1 (3.1) 3.1 (8.9) 11.3 (2.4) 3.2 (-0.4) -0.6 
2060 (3.8) 4.8 (2.0) 2.0 (9.0) 12.3 (2.7) 3.8 (-0.5) -0.7 
2070 (2.8) 3.9 (1.3) 1.0 (6.7) 10.5 (2.0) 3.4 (-0.4) -0.6 
2080 (1.6) 2.8 (0.6) 0.5 (3.7) 7.9 (1.1) 2.6 (-0.2) -0.5 
2090 (0.4) 2.0 (-0.4) 0.6 (1.5) 5.1 (0.6) 1.6 (-0.1) -0.3 
2100 (0.2) 1.1 (-0.1) 0.4 (0.5) 2.5 (0.2) 0.8 (-0.0) -0.2 
2150 (0.0) -0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) -0.0 (-0.0) -0.0 (0.0) 0.0 
2200 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (-0.0) -0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 
Note: The results for Plan 1 in Table A1 are reported in the parentheses for comparison. Reported on the right side of 
the parentheses are the results for Plan 2. The percentage deviation levels from the benchmark model are reported. 
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